ICFLPP continues to work with leading legal practitioners to assist the court on a neutral basis when invited to do so in order to provide its research-based expertise on cross border disputes, child autonomy, parental responsibility and identity and selfhood.

These are some of the cases in which ICFLPP has intervened:

In the Petition of DM (Nos 1 and 2) [2026] UKSC 21

X and Y (Children: Adoption Order: Setting Aside) [2026] UKSC 13

M.Z. v United Kingdom and S.V. v United Kingdom App nos 13435/24 and 14002/24 (ECtHR, 29 August 2025)

Re S (Wardship: Removal to Ghana) [2025] EWCA Civ 1011

Re G (Appellant) v G (Respondent) [2021] UKSC 9

https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2021/9.html

This appeal to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal (see intervention 8 above) concerned the relationship between the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention (hereafter the Convention) and the law relating to asylum. The facts relate to G, an 8-year old girl, who had been born in South Africa, and was habitually resident there. The appellant, G’s mother, had brought G to England without the father’s consent. G’s father, the respondent in this appeal, applied for G’s return to South Africa under the Convention. G’s mother opposed the return on the basis of article 13(b) of the Convention, i.e. that the return would cause a grave risk of harm to the child or would otherwise place her in an intolerable situation. The appellant stated that after separating from the respondent and telling her family that she was a lesbian, she had been the victim of death threats and violence from them. When she arrived in England she had applied for asylum based on her fear of further violence from her family. G was listed as a dependant on the appellant’s asylum application but G had not made an asylum application in her own right. The question of whether G was protected from refoulement (the unlawful return of a refugee under asylum law) by being a dependant on her mother’s asylum application and, thereby, could not be returned to South Africa until the determination of the asylum application, was considered by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court summary of the judgment explains the difficulties this may cause for the application of the Convention:

“..this raises the further question of how the 1980 HC proceedings and the asylum claim can be coordinated. An asylum claim can take months, if not years, to resolve, and the 1980 HC requires the prompt determination of an application for the return of an abducted child (which means, in this context, within six weeks). There is therefore a real risk that by the time the asylum claim has been determined, the relationship between the child and the left-behind parent will be harmed beyond repair. There is also a real risk in cases of this type that the taking parent will seek to achieve that objective by making a sham or tactical asylum claim”. https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2020-0191-press-summary.pdf

ICFLPP submitted that it was possible to consider the protection issues in the course of Convention proceedings, thereby avoiding the difficulties set out above. Paragraph 51 of the Supreme Court judgment states:

“The second intervener, The International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice (“the ICFLPP”) …acknowledged that the Secretary of State has the sole power to determine applications for asylum. However, it was submitted that an entitlement to protection from refoulement can be asserted and determined within the process of the 1980 Hague Convention proceedings. That was an issue which had not been raised by the father, so at the conclusion of the hearing the court invited written submissions from the parties and from all the interveners in relation to it and in particular to the following question:

In circumstances where an application for asylum has been made by or on behalf of a child and the Secretary of State has not yet made a decision on the application, is there any bar in law to a Family Court deciding in Hague Convention proceedings that the child is not a refugee and making and implementing an order for the return of the child to the country from which he or she has been removed in accordance with the Hague Convention?”.

The Supreme Court decided that the High Court should be slow to stay Convention proceedings. The Convention application may be determined by the High Court but any order for return cannot be implemented until the determination of the asylum application. A child who can be objectively understood to be an applicant for asylum cannot be returned to the country from which (s)he has sought refuge before the final determination of the asylum claim, which includes the conclusion of any appeal. If the asylum application is successful the High Court has the power to set aside its order. The case was remitted to the High Court for reconsideration of the 1980 Convention proceedings on that basis.

ICFLPP was represented pro bono in this intervention by James Turner QC, Mehvish Chaudhry and Paige Campbell, instructed by Bindmans LLP.

Re B (A Child) (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1187

https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/1187.html

The family lived in Australia before moving to France on 1 December 2019 as this was where the father came from. The father had a 6 month probationary period in his new job in France, and the mother had left open her job in Australia under January 2021. They decided to spend Christmas with the mother’s family in England. The father returned to France as arranged on 27 December in order to start his new job, and the mother was due to return on 5 January. However, she informed the father on 3 January that the relationship was over, and she was not going to return to France. The father applied for an order that the child be returned to France. Mrs Justice Judd dismissed that application on the basis that the child was habitually resident in Australia, not France, on the date when the mother had unlawfully retained her in England & Wales and so, in her view, the Hague Convention did not apply.

The Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Moylan, Lord Justice Baker and Lord Justice Phillips) decided that this was incorrect, and that the child had been habitually resident in France at the relevant date. However, the question of returning a child to a third State being one which was also in issue in other pending cases, the court went on to consider the general principle of whether power exists under the 1980 Convention to return a child to a state other than the one in which they had been habitually resident. In obiter comments at para 104 Moylan L.J stated his view that this power does exist. He relied on the Perez-Vera Explanatory Report (para 110) to demonstrate the express consideration which was given to this issue at the time of drafting the 1980 Hague Convention when a proposal that the return should always be to the state of habitual residence had not been adopted.

ICFLPP was represented pro bono in this intervention by Christopher Hames QC and Harry Langford, instructed by Freemans LLP.

Re S (A Child) [2019] EWCA Civ 352

https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2019/352.html

This Court of Appeal case concerned the proper consideration of the effectiveness of protective measures put in place after undertakings were provided by the father where the order for return was to a country which was not the State of the child’s habitual residence. The return order granted by the first instance court was set aside by the Court of Appeal. ICFLPP was represented as intervener by Henry Setright QC of 4 Paper Buildings, and Mehvish Chaudhury of Harcourt Chambers, instructed by Dawson Cornwell.

In the Matter of Re NY [2019] UKSC 49

In the Matter of C (Children) [2018] UKSC 8

https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2017-0135.html

This appeal concerned changes in habitual residence in abduction cases, and the question of whether anticipatory breach/repudiatory retention is recognised under the 1980 Child Abduction Convention. The Court held that repudiatory retention is possible in law. ICFLPP was represented by Stewarts Law, and Mark Jarman, and Christopher Hames, QC, of 4 Paper Buildings.

Re N (Adoption: Article 15 Transfer) [2016] UKSC 15

https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0013-judgment.pdf

This was a case relating to care proceedings and the planned non-consensual adoption of two foreign national children, and whether England and Wales, or Hungary, should have jurisdiction about the welfare of these two children who were Hungarian nationals but who had lived in England throughout their lives. The Court of Appeal had concluded that the court in England and Wales has jurisdiction to make a non-consensual adoption order for a foreign national child – see N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) [2015] EWCA Civ 1112 . Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2203 (Brussels 11a) does not apply to placement and adoption proceedings, but it does apply to care proceedings. Jurisdiction under Brussels 11a is determined by habitual residence (article 8). Article 15, however, allows the transfer of proceedings to a court in another Member State with which the child has a particular connection if it is better placed to hear the case and this would be in the best interests of the child.

The mother applied successfully to the High Court (supported by the father, and the Hungarian Central Authority) under Article 15 to transfer the care proceedings to Hungary. The children’s guardian appealed this judgment unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, and then appealed again to the Supreme Court where the issues were about the proper approach to the best interests of the children in an Article 15 application. The court considered that a number of factors will be relevant both to the question of whether a court is ‘better placed’ to hear the proceedings and of whether transfer is in the ‘best interests’ of the child, but that these are separate questions and must be addressed separately (paragraph 57). The answer to the second does not inexorably follow from the first. There is no reason to exclude the short or longer term impact of a transfer on the children’s welfare in determining whether a transfer would be in the children’s best interests.

The Supreme Court held that the first instance judge had been wrong on the facts of the case to conclude that the Hungarian authorities were better placed to hear the case having left out of account the preclusion of one possible outcome which might be in the best interests of the children concerned (see paragraph 45) whereas retaining jurisdiction would allow all the possible outcomes to be considered. The court set aside the request for a transfer of proceedings and returned the case to the High Court. The Centre was represented pro bono in this case by Mr. David Williams QC and Ms. Jacqueline Renton (both of 4 Paper Buildings) instructed by Kingsley Napley, again acting pro bono.

Re R [2016] EWCA Civ 1016

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2016/1016.html

This was a case concerning the unilateral removal by the mother of a child from his home in one part of England and Wales to another part of the country and raised issues about whether this amounts to an internal abduction (rather than relocation), and whether there should be a general principle of summary return in these circumstances to the place of former residence in line with the principles of international child abduction. The case is said to be ‘an interesting read for practitioners’, see for example http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed168323 Reported concerns about practitioners’ lack of clarity in this area in terms of advice offered to clients involved in these issues was one of the reasons that the ICFLPP sought permission to intervene in the Court of Appeal hearing. The court held that there was no general principle in favour of summary return, and such cases were to be decided according to the welfare principle and checklist in S1 Children Act 1989.

A lively post-judgment discussion took place in the practitioners’ peer-to-peer seminar held by Kingsley Napley (pro bono instructing solicitors on behalf of the Centre in this case) on 30th November 2016 where Professor Freeman talked about her abduction research, which included cases which were not international in nature, and counsel which represented the ICFLPP pro bono in the Court of Appeal, Mr. David Williams QC and Ms. Jacqueline Renton (both of 4 Paper Buildings) spoke about the judgment and its implications.

In the Matter of B (A Child) (Habitual Residence) (Inherent Jurisdiction) [2016] UKSC 4

https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0214-judgment.pdf

This case concerned a 7-year-old British National girl whose biological mother was a British citizen of Pakistani origin. The child was born as a result of IVF provided to the biological mother and her same-sex partner using donor sperm. The mother’s partner, who undertook most of the child care, did not have parental responsibility for the child. The relationship between the mother and her partner broke down after which the mother’s partner continued to see the child but the separation was acrimonious and contact was progressively reduced by the mother who, sometime later, took the child to live permanently in Pakistan without notification to her previous partner who then began proceedings for shared residence or contact with the child. Such relief was dependent on the child being habitually resident in the jurisdiction. On discovering that the child had been removed, she also applied for wardship and return of the child to the jurisdiction. The first instance judge held that the child had lost her habitual residence in England when she left for Pakistan and, therefore, relief was not available under the Children Act 1989, and that the inherent jurisdiction should only be exercised if the circumstances were dire and exceptional, and this case did not fall within those categories.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The Centre was given permission to intervene in the further appeal to the Supreme Court in which it was represented pro bono by Mr. Henry Setright QC, Mr. Hassan Khan and Ms. Dorothea Gartland (all of 4 Paper Buildings), and Ms. Katy Chokowry (of 1 KBW) instructed by Dawson Cornwell, again on a pro bono basis. The appeal succeeded under the 1989 Act on the basis that the child remained habitually resident in England as she had not achieved the requisite degree of disengagement from her English environment. Accordingly, the court held that the appellant’s application under the 1989 Act could and should proceed to substantive determination by the High Court. It was therefore unnecessary for the court to decide whether the inherent jurisdiction could be exercised.

In the Matter of J (A Child) [2015] UKSC 70

https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0176-judgment.pdf

This case was the first to reach the Supreme Court on the application of the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (the 1996 Convention) which came into force in the United Kingdom on 1 November 2012. It concerned a child who was removed from Morocco without his father’s consent. Although Morocco has acceded to the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, the accession has not been accepted by the United Kingdom.

The father brought proceedings in the High Court for the summary return of the child where the case was treated as being one under the inherent jurisdiction. The court held that the child remained habitually resident in Morocco, and made an order for the child to return there.

The mother appealed to the Court of Appeal and, at this point, the focus became the 1996 Convention and, in particular, article 11. Jurisdiction under the 1996 Convention is based on habitual residence, but article 11 confers an additional jurisdiction on the State where the child is currently present to take any necessary measures of protection in all cases of urgency. The court found that a return order was capable of being a “measure of protection” within article 11, but that this was not a case of urgency as the father could have made an immediate application to the Moroccan court for a return order. Therefore, the court found that there was no jurisdiction to make a return order.

The father appealed to the Supreme Court which, in unanimously allowing the appeal, held that it is open to the English courts to exercise the article 11 jurisdiction in cases of wrongful removal under the 1996 Convention, and stated that: [i]t would be extraordinary if, in a case to which the 1980 Convention did not apply, the question of whether to order the summary return of an abducted child were not a case of “urgency” even if it was ultimately determined that it was not “necessary” to order the return of the child (paragraph 38).

The Centre, which was represented pro bono by Mr. Richard Harrison QC (1 KBW) and Dr. Rob George (Harcourt Chambers), instructed by Bindmans LLP, also on a pro bono basis, raised concerns about the absence of interim contact. Professor Freeman’s research on this issue was referred to at paragraph 43 of the Supreme Court’s judgment.

Re C (Internal Relocation) [2015] EWCA Civ 1305

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/1305.html

This case concerned the legal test to be applied in internal relocation cases, and whether a distinction existed between that and the legal test to be applied in international relocation cases in view of the different ways in which the law had historically dealt with these two situations. The Centre was given permission to intervene in the appeal, which concerned a key area of Professor Freeman’s research, and was represented pro bono by Mr. Damian Garrido QC and Dr. Rob George, both of Harcourt Chambers, instructed by Dawson Cornwell, again on a pro bono basis. The Court of Appeal, which recognised the Centre’s ‘comprehensive submissions’ at paragraph 25, held that the correct test for internal relocation cases is the same as that for international relocation cases, i.e. welfare. This has been heralded as an important decision because of its clarification of the principles to be applied in such cases. Much has been written about this case and its implications by legal and other practitioners working in this field, as well as families involved in such cases for whom clarity has been extremely welcome.

In the Matter of A (Children) (AP) [2013] EWCA Civ 1396 & [2013] EWCA Civ 232

I (A Child) [2009] UKSC 10

G (A Child: Child Abduction) [2020] EWCA 1185

https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/1185.html

The Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Hickinbottom, Lord Justice Moylan and Lord Justice Peter Jackson) considered the situation where tension exists between returning a child promptly under the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, and recognising the obligations under immigration law to avoid expelling or returning a refugee to a country where they may face persecution. In this case the mother and child had come to the UK from South Africa after which the father applied under the 1980 Hague Convention for the return of the child. The mother claimed asylum saying that she was a lesbian and was under threat from her family because of this. The Secretary of State for the Home Department wrongly thought that the child had also applied for asylum. On this basis, the court at first instance stayed proceedings while the asylum claims of the mother and child were determined. The father appealed the staying order at which point it was confirmed that the mother had only applied for asylum for herself and for the chld as her dependent. The father appealed to the Court of Appeal which upheld his appeal (para 184) having concluded that the judge was wrong to proceed on the basis that there was a bar to determining the 1980 Hague Convention application, because (i) contrary to the facts as she had been given them, no independent application for asylum had been made by or on behalf of [the child] and (ii) in any event, there was no bar to determining the application or even to making a return order, as opposed to implementing any such order.

ICFLPP was represented pro bono in this intervention by James Turner QC, Mehvish Chaudhry and Paige Campbell, instructed by Bindmans LLP.

The Centre is involved in other interventions, details of which will be added as they become available.